The USF Wall of Shame

At the University of South Florida, we understand that everyone makes mistakes. But some missteps are so egregious that they can't be overlooked, and that's why the USF Wall of Shame was created. This wall serves as a reminder of those who have failed to uphold the ethical and moral standards of the USF community.

The Loathsome Fifteen.

1) Lt. Gen.(retd.) Martin R. STEELE.

United States Marine Corps.

-Introduced to this student’s senior year capstone course as a guest speaker.

-In class, the General Officer supervised a mandatory personality test administered to all students for the industrial engineering class year of 2017.

-Remained a mystery, a no-show to students for the subsequent years' capstone courses in the industrial engineering program.

-Later, this man turned out to be a ‘liaison’ between the U.S.F and the U.S. Intelligence Services.

2) ZAYAS-CASTRO, Jose.

Former Dean(internal affairs), College of Engineering, U.S.F.

College

-Maintained oversight of activities and adversarial actions perpetrated against Farrukh within the college of Engineering.

-Invited General(retd.) STEELE to Farrukh’s capstone class for the purpose of administering a personality test, essentially aiding the penetration of Intelligence Services within the college of engineering.

3) SULLIVAN, William Lee.

Special Agent, Department of Homeland Security.

- At all relevant times, Agent SULLIVAN and his associates were a frequent visitor to the U.S.F Tampa Campus.

-At all relevant times, Agent SULLIVAN was infamously known to be hounding foreign students at the U.S.F Tampa campus.

-Agent SULLIVAN along with another federal agent raided Farrukh’s residence in 2016, confiscating his passport and immigration paperwork necessary for the continuation of academic processes at U.S.F.

-On demanding an incident report for that raid, Farrukh was informed that no incident report was generated for the action, meaning that this raid was illegal.

-During all relevant times, Mr. SULLIVAN was purported to have engaged in similar inflammatory behavior towards foreign students of Russian and Chinese origin.

Truly a badge of DIS-HONOR for this Tampa Robinhood.

4) Jebreil/Jibriel/Jibril/Jebreel, Omar Taher

Palestinian Jordanian-Doctoral Student At USF FBI+FIS Informant

-With extensive links to government officials in Jordan & U.S., Omar Jebreil acted as an informant and gave out information on Farrukh about his day-to-day activities.

-Being an invited guest at Omar's residence in 2022 during his last days before his departure from the U.S., Citing security concerns and threats, Farrukh had advised and asked Omar to not share the details of his final departure from the U.S.

-In less than 2 weeks before Farrukh's travel out, Omar Jebriel leaked Farrukh's travel plans to people linked with the FBI.

-Farrukh received this news in the form of threats received to his family and confronted Jebriel. Jebriel became furious and made threats insinuating the use of force over text messages. Farrukh informed his contacts of the developing situation, who advised him to report to the police immediately, which he did.

-When Farrukh again confronted the two(Jebreil & his roommate) about the leak of his travel plans, the two student informants violently attacked him, hitting him with metal chairs and objects.

-Farrukh was badly injured and bruised and had no choice but to defend himself by using mace to get out of the ambush that had been set in place.

-Farrukh again phoned the police twice for assistance, with the help of passersby outside the apartment. When the cops arrived, they looked to be on Farrukh's side at first. However, when a guy in plain clothes came to the incident site, the police's reaction altered.

-Citing his own safety concerns, police arrested Farrukh. He was told, "We can't just leave you here with those two." It is not safe for you.". Farrukh was shocked and confused about what was happening.

-Farrukh was detained and then released three days later. As a result of this incident, Farrukh's passport was stolen after his release and barely 5 days before his ultimate departure. Even though the offender, an Uber driver, had been discovered and acknowledged to have the paperwork on him over the phone & in the presence of a Hillsborough County deputy sheriff, the police remained unconcerned about recovering the missing travel document.

-This was not a first for Omar, though. Omar was previously suspected of committing a similar plot against a doctoral engineering student at USF named Abdullah Q, also a Jordanian national.

-Between 2020-2021, Omar had invited Abdullah Q. to stay in his apartment as a paying guest a few months before his final departure from the U.S., while he and Farrukh were housemates.

-Abdullah Q. found himself in a similar situation to Farrukh and was openly telling people that the FBI was after him. However, Omar would rudely dismiss Abdullah Q. or verbally get into altercations which Farrukh saw take place on many occasions. In Abdullah's absence, Omar would claim that Abdullah Q. was mentally unstable. Though Abdullah Q. had been diagnosed with depression which he claimed was a result of harassment from the FBI, he was still of sound reasoning and cognition.

-And suddenly, Abdullah Q. vanished from the house one morning. When Farrukh realized there were new blood stains on the house's front entrance, he asked Omar Jebriel about it. Omar Jebriel showed apathy and said he didn't know.

-When asked where Abdullah Q. had gone, Omar avoided Farrukh and said murkily that "Abdullah" had probably departed for good, despite the fact that all of Abdullah Q's goods and personal items had been left at the residence.

-Omar's actions, the police conduct, and the outcome of these incidents make it crystal clear that Omar is an asset of the Intelligence Services, acting not on his own accord but on the orders of whoever controls him.

-This individual earns the trust of others, only to betray them later.

5) Mustafa, Ayman Odeh

Palestinian-Jordanian

FBI+FIS Informant-Former USF Student

-Omar Jebreil's housemate.

-Acted as a co-conspirator and accomplice of Omar Jebreil in providing information about Farrukh's day-to-day activities and the attempted assault on Farrukh.

-Bizarre as it sounds, Ayman displays many signs of schizophrenia; he has proclaimed himself to be the divinely chosen anti-Christ and has confided in Farrukh about his desire to kill people with the collection of his skull hammers. Furthermore, he has expressed his wish to buy firearms. It is evident that this case presents a potentially dangerous combination of schizophrenia and firearms, leaving one to ponder what could possibly go wrong here. It is uncertain if his actions were staged or not.

-If this was Ayman Mustafa's default state of mind, it's not surprising that this is the profile of a person who generally ends up being a mentally deranged shooter who maims and kills people. When news of these persons being in contact with the FBI surfaces online, one wonders if the agency and the incident(s) are part of the same puzzle. It is too early to draw conclusions, but this is probably a good time to keep Ayman Mustafa in the loop.

6) TAYLOR, Marcia. Director, U.S.F Office of International Services

-Key architect of the plot to channel Farrukh into joining the ranks of the U.S. intelligence services. -‘Eyes and Ears’ of the Intelligence Services on the U.S.F Tampa Campus. -By refusing to rebuff F.B.I’s requests as demonstrated by Ellen Badger, International Office director from S.U.N.Y, and instead Ms. TAYLOR facilitated the F.B.I’s efforts openly & belligerently in an attempt to coerce Farrukh into working for the U.S. Intelligence. -From providing personal and family background information on Farrukh to D.H.S, the F.B.I and others, to unlawfully interfering with his academic pursuits or engaging in an absolute display of disruptive behavior, Ms. TAYLOR engaged in preemptive retributive measures in a failed effort to coerce Farrukh into either dropping out of college or in the alternative to persuade him into switching his major to general studies, presumably, to redirect his career path from engineering to working clandestine within the U.S. military-industrial-intelligence complex. -Purported to have engaged in similar pestering conduct towards foreign students of Russian and Chinese origin. 7) ABAID, Nicholas. F.B.I Special Agent(ex), Private Military Contractor.

-Operating out of F.B.I’s Trenton Field Office(New Jersey) and previously involved with the recruiting of Dr. Dajin Peng(U.S.F), pressuring him into spying for the F.B.I & the C.I.A. -Also implicated with the recruitment of a now condemned foreign nuclear physicist from Pakistan. An ill-fated savant who has now been handed down a death sentence on charges of engaging in espionage activities for the C.I.A. -Mr. ABAID is suspected to have played an active role in attempting to set up(allure) Farrukh into working for the U.S. Intelligence Services overseas, possibly & likely against his friends and relatives who reside in his country of origin. -Among other instances, Mr. ABAID is Suspected to have employed a man, another stranger to Farrukh, who had expressed to Farrukh his affiliations to the F.B.I. This man had approached the student and like other people who had approached Farrukh before him, offered Farrukh a path to acquiring the U.S. Citizenship, which Farrukh had politely declined. That man had encouraged the student to consider traveling to New Jersey from where he had arrived to meet Farrukh in Tampa, Fl. 8) MERCURIO, Dianne. F.B.I Special Agent, Tampa Field Office.

A frequent visitor to the U.S.F Tampa campus. -Previously known to have engaged in coercive practices against Dr. Dajin Peng, demanding that he spy for the F.B.I and later the C.I.A against China overseas. -It remains blurry but appears probable that, MS. MERCURIO or an associate twice made attempts to initiate contact with Farrukh. Once, during a graduation party at a local nightclub and then again in the vicinity of his residence a few months later. -Ms. MERCURIO or an associate, pursued in tandem, another close friend of Farrukh who too showed little reciprocity towards the overtures. 9) REEVES, Kingsley. Undergraduate Program Coordinator, Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering.

-’Eyes and Ears’ of the Intelligence Services at U.S.F Tampa Campus. -Known to carry a manifest animus towards students of middle eastern and Asian origin. All while keeping a charming persona, a facade, it is no wonder the F.B.I found him to be a useful tool, one that could be employed against Farrukh. -To constrict and ensnare Farrukh, this man engaged in an extremely hostile attitude towards the student, often evading his meeting requests, refusing to issue him permits for course registrations or in the alternative to have him dropped from courses mid-semester, all with the intent to bring about frustration by causing disruption of academic process. -Mr. REEVES encouraged another professor to sanction Farrukh on false pretenses and trumped up academic misconduct charges in a course that Farrukh was enrolled in during his final semester of academic training at U.S.F. Charges that were later recanted by the professor in writing multiple times during the course of an independent investigation and where she changed her story. -Alas, during the course of this investigation, Mr. REEVES once again availed the opportunity to produce insensitive and defamatory remarks in a conceited move to disparage this student. Statements that are now public record. 10) CRUZ-MUJICA, Amanda. F.B.I/D.H.S Confidential Informant. Founder, WOKE Inc.Tampa, Fl

-A former student and a U.S.F employee. -’Eyes and Ears’ of the U.S. Intelligence at U.S.F Tampa Campus. -A former student and a U.S.F employee. -During all relevant times, CRUZ was tasked with collecting intelligence on activities of foreign & local students at U.S.F. -Assisted the F.B.I in ‘sneak and peak’ searches of his home when he was away. -Incite & Encouraged, Farrukh and those around him to produce or publish politically insensitive statements against the United States. 11) WEBB, Megan. F.B.I/D.H.S Confidential Informant. Co-Founder WOKE Inc. Tampa, Fl.

-A former student and a U.S.F employee. -’Eyes and Ears’ of the Intelligence Services at U.S.F Tampa campus. -During all relevant times, WEBB was tasked with collecting intelligence on activities of foreign & local students at U.S.F. -Assisted the F.B.I in ‘sneak and peak’ searches of his home when he was away. -Incite Engaged Farrukh and those around him to produce or publish politically insensitive statements against the United States. 12) ALSHAMRANI, Khaled. An F.B.I Confidential Informant. Member of the Saudi National Guard.

-A former student. -During all relevant times, ALSHAMRANI was tasked with collecting intelligence on activities of foreign & local students at U.S.F. -Assisted the F.B.I in ‘sneak and peak’ searches of Farrukh’s home when he was away. -Incite & Encouraged, Farrukh and those around him to produce or publish politically insensitive statements against the United States. 13)ADAMCHAK, Joanne. U.S.F Deputy General Counsel

-A former judge, Ms. ADAMCHAK provided falsified information to legal counsel and diplomatic officials who represented the student after the onset of his difficulties. -Dismissed multiple requests for reconsideration from officials representing the student. -Actively shielded the University’s actions and deceptively covered up their conduct while responding to queries put forward by the diplomatic mission of the student’s country of origin.

14)HALL, Kelly.

Associate Director, Office of International Services U.S.F.

-As a means of retribution employed against Farrukh for his filing of complaints against Ms. HALL, Ms. HALL provided falsified information to his would-be employer pertaining to his immigration status.

- In an effort to hinder the academic process and cause disruption towards his academic endeavors, Ms. HALL wantonly relayed incorrect and misleading information about the student’s immigration status to academic departments within U.S.F.

-During all relevant times, Ms. HALL employed similar coercive practices towards foreign students from Russia and China.

15)HEINZELMANN, Emily.

-First of many assigned to allure Farrukh into working clandestinely for the U.S. Intelligence Services.

-A U.S.F alumni, and a complete stranger to Farrukh, Ms. HEINZELMANN approached Farrukh in person and also electronically on his private email address, which, in ordinary circumstances, she shouldn’t have been privy to. -At a time when the U.S.F was refusing to issue him his fully earned engineering degree and his immigration status was hanging in limbo, Ms. HEINZELMANN made repeated job offers to Farrukh in the field of finance which he either didn’t qualify for or wasn't cut out for.